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Summary 
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which 
investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public 
goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show 
that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties 
chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no 
party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and 
the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to 
occur. 
 
Keywords: Cycles, Alternation, Public goods, Advantage, Opposition 
 
JEL Classification: D72, H41, C72 
 
This is a revised version of ”Political Cycles: a suggested interpretation”, GREQAM 
WP 12-2005. The authors thank Francis Bloch, Guillaume Girmens, Didier Laussel and 
Thierry Mayer as well as many seminars and congresses participants at Aix-en-
provence, Beijing, Dublin, Lille, Marseille and New York for their helpful comments. 














Address for correspondence: 
 
Pascal Gautier 
GREQAM, Université d’Aix-Marseille II 
Château Lafarge, Route des Milles 
13290 Les Milles 
France 
Phone: +33 0 442935980 
Fax: +33 0 442930968 
E.mail: pgautier@univaix 
 
 In modern democracies, the alternation of political parties in power is
a frequent phenomenon. Why isn’t there a greater persistence of parties in
power ? How can one explain the turnover of parties in government ? How
can one explain political cycles ? We propose a theoretical model of political
cycles, where the share of a party’s vote decreases with the time it controls
government. This eﬀect, that we call “the opposition advantage”, is diﬀer-
ent from the well known incumbent eﬀect. Indeed, the incumbency eﬀect
measures the advantage given to the incumbent candidate competing with
a challenger. The opposition eﬀect measures the advantage of a candidate
aﬃliated to the opposition party, when he competes against a candidate of
the party in power, who is not necessarily the incumbent politician.
We propose an explanation of the opposition advantage and show that it
can be a cause for political and policy cycles. We propose an inﬁnite horizon
model of repeated elections with two parties built on two main assumptions:
policies have long-term eﬀects1, but are not irreversible, and parties have
comparative advantages for the provision of two public goods. The two goods
are imperfectly substituable for voters. For example, citizens need good
education and security at the same time. When voters are moderate, they
may wish that both parties govern, but they can only elect one of them at a
time. In this context, the opposition party can oﬀer more moderate policies.
Indeed, the opposition can propose to keep the incumbent party policy long-
term eﬀect and satisfy voters in focusing on the public good that it has a
comparative advantage upon. On the contrary, the party in power cannot
beneﬁt from the comparative advantage of the opposition party. These two
arguments suggest that the opposition party may be advantaged.
Our analysis has to be distinguished from studies focusing on politicians’
careers and swings in their popularity. A large strand of this literature deals
with the “Incumbency advantage”2. This theory is supported by overwhelm-
ing evidence, both in Senate elections and in elections to the House of rep-
resentatives. Some of the major factors of the incumbency advantage are
1Many public goods have long-term eﬀect. Important examples are national defense
activities, welfare programs, environmental clean-up, buiding states schools, roads ....
2Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) provide an excellent survey of the incumbency ad-
vantage literature, and an empirical contribution on state and federal elections in U.S. for
the period 1942-2000. They ﬁnd strong support for the incumbency advantage in state
executives elections and conclude that explanations speciﬁc to the legislators incumbency
advantage are not convincing.
2redistricting3, seniority systems4, and the lack of collective responsibility5.
Scholars explain political cycles with psychological arguments6, the main
one being disappointment. The “Negativity eﬀect” theory7 is built on the
following remark: voters’ decisions are based on the incumbent’s past perfor-
mance and negative pieces of information have a greater impact than positive
pieces of information. There exist two diﬀerent explanations for this obser-
vation, the ﬁrst one suggests that voters have a high esteem for powerful
ﬁgures and are more easily disappointed than positively surprised by the
government performance; the second (Abelson and Levy, 1985) states that
the electorate has a strong risk aversion for potential costs of re-electing a
politician who has demonstrated his bad performance. In the light of the
negativity eﬀect, Aragones (1997) obtains a result of systematic alternation
of the two parties implementing diﬀerent policies. In our analysis, there is
no uncertainty and electorate decisions are not based on past performance,
but as usually in political models, for their preferred party at each election.
Finally, the negativity and incumbency eﬀects aﬀect the election outcome
in opposing directions. The ﬁrst one leads to the defeat of the incumbent
, whereas the second one leads to the re-election of the incumbent. Both
theories focus on individual politicians. Diﬀerently, our study does not deal
with politicians but with parties.
In our model, political cycles emerge as a consequence of the opposition
eﬀect. There exists very few models considering this determinant of politi-
cal cycles. Kramer (1977) and Bendor, Mookherjee and Ray (2005), study
dynamic models of electoral competition between two parties with myopic
behavior. Kramer (1977) suppose that the incumbent cannot change his pol-
icy whereas the challenger can locate anywhere in the policy space. He shows
that candidates systematically alternate in power. Bendor, Mookherjee and
3Cox and Katz (2002) state that redistricting caused the rise of legislators incumbency
advantage after the 60s.
4McKelvey and Riezman (1992) argue that seniority tends to create a disencentive to
vote for challengers.
5See Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4) for a survey of the incumbents account-
ability literrature.
6See Goertzel (2005) for a review of the american voters mood changes literrature.
Schlesinger (1949, 1986, 1992) consider that the electorate is inevitably disappointed by
the party or the ideology that is in power. Klinberg (1952) suggests that American mood
in public opinion balances between introversion and extroversion. This could expalin why
domestic and foreign concerns alternate through time and parties turnover in power.
7See Aragones (1997) for a survey.
3Ray (2005) propose a model based on a satisfycing behavior of the incumbent
and a search behavior of the challenger. If the winning candidate is satis-
ﬁed, then he does not change his policy until he loses the election, whereas
the challenger is not satisﬁed, then he searches a policy that can defeat the
incumbent. In our study, parties, once elected, are not constrained to keep
their policy the next election. Parties behave strategically, they try to win
the present election in selecting their platforms and their behavior do not
change whether they are in power or not.
Another topic related to our analysis are policy cycles. Many scholars
argue that policy cycles are generated by economic cycles8. We propose
a diﬀerent explanation;.in our model, policy cycles are not generated by
economic shocks but by the political structure. Since parties implement
diﬀerent policies9, political turnover and policy changes are clearly related.
In a very diﬀerent framework, Roemer (1995) shows that policy cycles arise
because of stochastic changes in voters preferences in a model with policy
motivated candidates with uncertainty. Our approach is diﬀerent in many
aspects. We suppose that parties are only oﬃce motivated and the non-
convergence of platforms does not result from uncertainty but from parties
multidimensional heterogeneity. Furthermore, we show that perpetual cycles
(but not necessarily periodic) appear in a context with no uncertainty.
In considering an inﬁnite number of successive elections and a dynamic
link coming from public policies long-term eﬀects, our work contributes to the
literature of inﬁnite horizon models of repeated elections. This literature is
mainly focused on the dynamic ineﬃciency of government 10. Battaglini and
Coate (2005) consider an inﬁnite horizon model of collective spending and
taxation. Public decisions are determined through a legislative bargaining
process. Agents are forward looking, they take decisions in anticipating the
8A huge litterature studies political business cycles. See Berry (1991) for a survey.
9Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982), and Chappel and Keech (1986) show that Democrat and
Republican governments have diﬀerent inﬂuences on the unemployment rate. Alesina
and Sachs (1988) and Tabellini and La Via (1989) show that parties are associated with
diﬀerent monetary policies.
10Baron (1996) studies a dynamic model of pork barrel policies. Gomes and Jehiel (2004)
analyze the persistence of inneﬃciencies in a general framework of social and economic
interactions that can be applied to legislative bargaining, coalition formation or exchange
economies. Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) study public good provision in an
OLG model, where an age-dependant taxation creates distorsions in human capital invest-
ment. Azzimonti, Sarte and Soares (2003) focus on the role of commitment in a dynamic
public spending and taxation model.
4outcomes of futures elections. The authors objective is very diﬀerent from
ours, because they concentrate on long-term government ineﬃciencies11. We
do not analyze taxation and debt problems, then we suppose that the tax
rate is ﬁxed and that there is no saving and no debt.
Finally, in considering parties with diﬀerent competences, our work con-
tributes to the literature on valence in politics. A growing literature deals
with models where policy and quality are orthogonal dimensions12. Here,
we suppose that parties’ competences are diﬀerent according to the diﬀer-
ent policies13. Other authors analyze agency problems14, where politicians
are associated to a policy-dependent competence level and voters have in-
complete information on politicians type and/or actions15. We extend the
assumption of heterogeneous competences to the case of two dimensions, but
we suppose that they are common knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we present voters behavior
and parties constraints. In section 2, we derive the multiple possible outcomes
of the electoral competition. In section 3, we show that the opposition party
is advantaged. In section 4, we present our main results: the probability
of winning cannot converge; when the median voter is extremist, a party
can stay in power for ever, whereas when he is moderate, no party can keep
power for ever; and we show that cycles are more likely to occur when the
depreciation rate is low and when parties are strongly specialized. In section
11In a close study, Azzimonti-Renzo (2005) analyzes government long-term inneﬃciences
when the decision maker is atomistic.
12This literrature, initiated by Stokes (1992) focus on the problem of equilibrium exis-
tence and platforms location in spatial models when candidates have diﬀerent “scores” on
the quality dimension. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) study the unidimensional model
in a world of certainty; Aragones and Palfrey (2002) analyze the case where candidates
maximize their share of votes and overcome the pure strategy equilibrium non-existence
problem in studying mixed strategy equilibrium for small advantage levels. Groseclose
(1999) and Aragones and Palfrey (2004) add candidates policy concerns.
13As noticed by Prat (2002): “One may doubt that [voters] utility is separable in policy
and valence. A left wing voter may prefer an inept right-wing politician to an eﬀective
right-wing politician because the latter is more likely to live up to his or promises and
pass right-wing legislation. Still, an inept politician creates pure ineﬃciencies which are
costly to all citizens.”
14See again Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4, section 4.7) for a review of this
literature.
15Rogoﬀ and Siebert (1988) propose a model of adverse selection and Rogoﬀ and Sun-
daram (1993, 1996) study politician accountability in models with moral hazard and ad-
verse selection.
56, we discuss two candidates objectives (re-election concerns and rent-seeker
candidates). Finally, we conclude in section 7.
1 The model
We consider an inﬁnite horizon model of repeated elections with two oppor-
tunistic parties A and B. Each period, voters elect a party and the new
government implements his platform. Then, another election takes place,
and so on. The government provides two durable public goods, a and b, that
depreciate each period with a constant rate δ in [0,1], and the government
’s budget is normalized to 1 at any period. A new government can either
keep the existing stocks or transform one of the public good into the other.
Speciﬁcally, if the level of public good g (g = a,b) after election t is gt and
Ig,t+1 new units are produced by the government in period t + 1, then the
level in period t + 1 is16:
gt+1 = (1 − δ)gt + Ig,t+1,
where g = a,b. The level gt+1 can be either greater or smaller than gt. When
gt+1 ≥ gt, this means that the government at time t + 1 chooses to keep the
stock of public good g. If gt+1 < gt, the government either undoes or does
not invest enough in good g to maintain its level. A policy zt is a couple of
public goods quantities (at,bt).
Voters:
Voters diﬀer in the weight they place on the two public goods. Voter
i’s weight for the ﬁrst public good is denoted by αi, belonging to the unit
interval [0,1]. The preferences of voter i are represented by:
Wi (at,bt) = αi ln(at) + (1 − αi)ln(bt),
where at and bt are the public goods stocks after date t. The policy after
election t is noticed zt = (at,bt).
This kind of preferences, introduced by Tabellini and Alesina (1990), al-
lows voters to disagree about which quantities of public goods to consume.
16Azzimonti-Renzo (2005) and Battaglini and Coate (2005) make the same assumption
on the long-term eﬀect of public spending.
6Furthermore, these preferences belong to the class of ”intermediate prefer-
ences” deﬁned by Grandmont (1978), and verify the single crossing property
(Grandmont, 1978). The median voter theorem applies, i.e. the median
voter’s preferred policy is the unique Condorcet winner. The preferred pol-
icy of the median voter, characterized by αm, is thus the Condorcet winner
in our context.
It is important to notice that the identity of the median voter αm, does
not depend on the date, i.e, is independent of the dynamics of the model.
Parties:
At each period, both parties propose credible platforms in order to win
the election. The government’s
budget constraint is:
Ia,t + Ib,t ≤ 1,
We deﬁne a party as a stable organization, which can provide the two pub-
lic goods. We suppose that the two parties are specialized: party A has
a comparative advantage in providing good a and party B a comparative
advantage in providing good b. This advantage will be captured by two con-
stants, ηA ∈]1,η] and ηB ∈]1,η] which are inversely related to the marginal
cost of providing the public goods. Finally, we suppose that the technology
for providing both public goods has constant returns to scale, with marginal
costs of 1/ηA and 1 for party A and 1 and 1/ηB for party B. With these
speciﬁcations in mind, we write the budget constraints of the two parties at
an election at date t as:
Party A:
at − (1 − δ)at−1
ηA + bt − (1 − δ)bt−1 ≤ 1, (A)
Party B:
at − (1 − δ)at−1 +
bt − (1 − δ)bt−1
ηB ≤ 1, (B)
where stocks of the two public goods must be positive, i.e., at,bt ≥ 0. In-
equality (A) deﬁnes party A’s set of policy A(t) and inequality (B) deﬁne
party B’s set of policy B(t).
72 Political Equilibria
2.1 The median voter choice
The median voter selects the winning party, and her choice drives the dynam-
ics of successive elections. We start the analysis by deriving her preferred
platform over the set of credible platforms. The median voter’s preferred
policy over A(t), denoted mA




s.t. : (at,bt) ∈ A(t)
and her preferred platform over B(t), denoted mB




s.t. : (at,bt) ∈ B(t)









































Hence, the derivation of the median voter’s preferred platform depends
on the public goods stocks at−1 and bt−1. She has to compare mA
t and mB
t .










The median voter weakly prefers mA
t to mB











. With simple computations, one can show that the median voter
weakly prefers mA
t to mB
t if and only if Λt (αm) ≥ 1. Not surprisingly, the
more A is competent, the less B is competent, and the more αm is high, the
higher the likelihood that the median voter chooses a policy in A’s policy
set.
82.2 Equilibria
Parties select their platforms in order to win the election. Party A (respec-
tively party B) maximizes is probability of victory πA
t (respectively πB
t ). In
the case where the median voter is indiﬀerent between the two programs, we
suppose that each party is equally likely to win the election. We denote by
zA
t party A’s platform and by zB
t party B’s platform in the election at date
t. Let MA(t) (respectively MB(t)) be the set of party A platforms strictly
preferred to mB






















Since parties are only interested in winning the election, a platform that the
rival cannot defeat is an equilibrium strategy. This leads to a multiplicity of
Nash equilibria, summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The set of Nash equilibrium is always non empty and is:
(i) MA(t) × B(t) if Λt > 1, and A is elected,







if Λt = 1, and A and B are elected with probability 1
2.
(Proofs are reported in the appendix.)
These results lead to several observations. First, because parties only
want to win the election and the information is complete, one party is in
general certain to be elected (in cases (i) and (ii)). This party can propose
many winning platforms, whereas the loser locates anywhere in his policy
set. Figure 2 illustrates this kind of equilibrium:
Second, in very speciﬁc circumstances (in case (iii)), the median voter is
indiﬀerent between the two parties (see Figure 3). If this event occurs, it will







































































Figure 2: Equilibrium strategies when Λt = 1
3 The opposition advantage
In this section, we discuss about the advantage conferred to the party in the
opposition. Consider two elections at dates t and t + 1, and suppose that B








10MB(t), one of his equilibrium platform for election t. Since B is the winner,
it is necessarily true that Λt ≤ 1. First remark that zB
t / ∈ A(t) because of
the deﬁnitions of MB(t) and mA
t , so that zB
t must satisfy
aB
t − (1 − δ)at−1
ηA + b
B
t − (1 − δ)bt−1 > 1,
This simply means that if A would try to imitate B at election t, then he







. This last equation can be then rewritten as follows:
s
A




t ∈ B(t), so that:
a
B
t − (1 − δ)at−1 +
bB





t − 1 ≤ (1 − δ)s
B
t−1. (2)



















t −1, only because sA
t and sB
t are
strictly greater than 1. Finally, the relative advantage of party A is strictly
greater at election t + 1 than at election t. This result is summarized in the
next proposition:
Proposition 2 At each election, the relative advantage of the opposition
party increases: for all t where A is the opposition party, Λt+1 > Λt.
(Proof: see the reasoning above.)
This result states that the share of votes of the opposition party generally
increases from one election to the next. The intuition of this result is that
when a party is elected, since he must implement his promises, he gives the
opposition party the opportunity to propose a more satisfactory platform on
both dimensions. This eﬀect drives the dynamics of elections and, when it
is suﬃciently large, can lead to a switch in power between the majority and
the minority.
114 Political Cycles
In this section, we study the dynamics of elections and public good provision.
The questions arising at this point are: What is the long run behavior of the
dynamics of elections ? Does the parties’ probability of winning converge to
one half ? How do cycles depends on the median voter preferences ? On the
parties competences ? On the durability of public goods?
4.1 Do parties’ winning probabilities converge?
We focus on the special case (iii), where each candidate has one half chance
of winning election k. We have shown that the sequence (Λt)t is decreasing
when A is not in power, and, by symmetry, is increasing when A is in power.
Then, the sequence is either always increasing and then for all t, Λt ≤ 1,
always decreasing and for all t, Λt ≥ 1, or follows a cycle.
This sequence can not converge to 1. Indeed, suppose that there exists
an election k such that Λk = 1. Then each party has one half chance of
being elected in k. Without loss of generality, suppose that A is elected,
then Λk+1 < Λk = 1, and party B is elected for sure in k + 1. The following
corollary of proposition 2 summarizes this result:
Corollary 1 If Λk = 1, the elected party in k is defeated in k + 1.
(The proof relies on the simple argument above.)
The intuition of this result is that, when the median voter is indiﬀerent
between both platforms (Λk = 1), he would indeed like both platforms to
be implemented in turn17. But only one party is elected, and provides a
polarized platform. At the next election, the opposition party will provide
a policy which uses the stock of public goods implemented by the majority,
but is closer to the median voter’s preferences.
4.2 Stable power
The following proposition provides suﬃcient conditions for a party to con-
stantly remain in power.
17The intuition is close to Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) at the diﬀerence that, in our
model, voters cannot mix policies during a unique mandate, but they get mixed policies
through successive mandates with parties turnover.






2 ×]1,η]2 × R2
+:
(i) If αm ∈ [0,α], then party B wins all elections,
(ii) If αm ∈ [α,1], then party A wins all elections.
(Proof: see the appendix)
The intuition of this result is straightforward. If the median voter has
extreme tastes, then one of the two parties is abbe to keep power forever by
exploiting its comparative advantage in providing one of the two policies.
4.3 Cycles
We now analyze cycles where parties alternate in power. We wish to know
when these cycles are not conjunctural, namely, when they are independent
of the initial stocks of public good, a0 and b0.We deﬁne political cycles in the
following way:







+, exhibits political cycles if and only if no party wins an inﬁnite number
of consecutive elections.
Formally, we study the case where the sequence (Λt)t does not converge
and does not diverge. Unfortunately, because there exist many equilibria at
each election, we cannot give necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the set
of parameters such that it exhibits political cycles. However, we propose a
suﬃcient condition for the existence of political cycles:





+, there exist α1 <
α2 both in [0,1], such that: if αm ∈ [α1,α2] no party can maintain itself
indeﬁnitely in power.
4.4 Comparative statics
Since there exist many equilibria, it seems complicated to provide general
comparative statics. To give an insight into the inﬂuence of the deprecia-
tion rate and the candidates competences on political cycles we suppose, for
simplicity, that the winning candidate always implements the median voter
13preferred platform18, that is mA
t (respectively mB
t ) when candidate A (re-
spectively candidate B) wins the election t. Furthermore, we consider the
simple case where ηA = ηB = η, i.e. when candidates are equally compe-
tent in their respective specialities. Under these assumptions, we obtain the
following comparative statics results:
Proposition 5 The interval [α1,α2] deﬁned in Proposition 4 is unique and,




∂ (α2 − α1)
∂δ
< 0.
The higher the specialization of parties, the larger the parameter range
for which political cycles occur. When parties become more specialized, they
implement more extreme policies and the median voter is more willing to
switch in order to see the other good provided. When the depreciation rate
increases, goods have shorter eﬀects and voters need less power turnover.
5 Extensions: parties’ lexicographic prefer-
ences
The results presented in the precedent sections hold without specifying the
choice of an elected party among the generally large set of winning policies.
We now allow parties to select one policy in order to maximize a sub-objective
function. In other words, parties of lexicographic preferences: they ﬁrst want
to be elected, and select among the winning platforms that platform which






































18The median voter preferred platform is always an equilibrium platform for the winning
candidate.







































Suppose that parties want to be re-elected, and consider the following re-
duced form for a long-run, non myopic behavior of political parties. At the
election at date t, the winning party’s subobjective is to maximize his relative
advantage in the next election, that is Λt+1 for party A, and 1
Λt+1 for party B.
A party ﬁrst wishes to be elected, and then to create the most favorable con-
ditions for its re-election. If Λt = 1, then equilibrium programs are derived






. But, if Λt 6= 1,
for example Λt > 1, then party A can choose many winning programs. In







∈ MA(t). Hence, its relative
















since Λt+1 is decreasing in at and increasing in bt, party A will choose a pro-
gram with a minimum of good a and a maximum of good b. Unfortunately,
Λt+1 has no maximum in MA(t), but it has a supremum value:
Proposition 6 Λt+1 admits a supremum over MA(t) and there exists a
unique corresponding program with a minimum quantity of a and a maxi-
mum quantity of b.
(The Proof is in the appendix)
This result suggests that parties seeking re-election choose very ineﬃcient
platforms, because they do not fully exploit their comparative advantage.
The intuition is that a party has to provide some of the public good that
he is not competent at producing, in order to induce voters to reelect him
next period. Figure 4 illustrates this ineﬃcient platform, denoted zA
t , when




































Figure 3: When candidate A has re-election concerns and Λt > 1
5.2 Rent-seeker candidates
The results of previous sections also hold when the candidates’ sub-objective
is to extract rents from power. Formally, if A wins the election, he chooses





























As in the case of reelection concerns, the problem has no maximum in MA(t),
but a supremum exists:







t−1 is the supremum of rA
t
over MA(t),
(ii) If Λt ≤ 1, rB∗
t = (1 − Λt)sB
t−1 is the supremum of rB
t over MB(t).
One can approximate the maximization program in supposing that the
winning candidate P chooses to extract rP∗
t −ε, with ε being an inﬁnitesimal
positive real number. Then, the higher the relative advantage of candidate
16A (Λt), the higher the rents he can extract. Figure 5 illustrates this result,





































Figure 4: When candidate A has re-election concerns and Λt > 1
Furthermore, notice that we know from Proposition 2, that Λt+1 > Λt.
Hence, if A wins the election at t and t + 1, we obtain that rA∗
t+1 < rA∗
t . This
would suggest that the longer a party is in power, the smaller the rents he can
extract.. We have to be cautious with this observation because of problems
of enforceability. Indeed, if parties cannot be forced to implement their
promises, an incumbent who is certain to lose the next election will extract
all the rents from power. Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4).discusses
this issue and provides a survey of the relevant literature.
6 Conclusion
We have considered an inﬁnite horizon dynamic model of public consump-
tion with durable public goods. We have shown that the longer a party keeps
power, the more the opposition is likely to come back to power. Therefore,
we have been able to show that policy and political cycles can occur, when
17the median voter preferences are balanced enough between the public goods
provided by the two parties. This result holds when the parties’ main objec-
tive is to win the election and is compatible with a large range of candidates
sub-objectives, that may change from one election to the next. In particular,
we have shown that a candidate seeking re-election will choose a very ineﬃ-
cient platform, providing the minimal quantity of the public good in which
he has a comparative advantage.
187 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:




t ∈ MA (t) 6= ∅. Let zA
t ∈ MA (t) and zB






















= (1,0) and no party has an incentive
to deviate. This implies that MA (t) × B(t) ⊂ E(t). Now, choose zA
t / ∈










. In this case πA
t < 1, then party A has
an incentive to move and play, for example, mA
t .
(ii) The proof is the symmetric reasoning of case (i).










. Suppose that party A
plays mA
t and party B chooses zB
t 6= mB
t . Since mB
t is the unique preferred

































is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let us consider an election at date t. Public goods stocks are ((1 − δ)at−1,(1 − δ)bt−1),
and:
Λt (αm) =






























￿ > 1 when αm = 1. Then,
there exists a unique value of αm, denoted b αt, such that Λt = 1 :










Since this is true for all t, there exist 0 < α < α < 1, such that for all t :
α < b αt < α,
Finally, if 0 ≤ αm ≤ α, then, for all t, Λt < 1, and B wins. If α ≤ αm ≤ 1,
then, for all t, Λt > 1, then A wins.
19Proof of Proposition 4:




t > (1 − δ)s
A




t ≤ (1 − δ)s
B
t−1 + 1. (4)
Claim 1: We claim that there exists k such that for all t ≥ k, B wins the
election t. Then the two precedent inequalities hold for all t ≥ k, then, for
all t > k:
s
A
t > (1 − δ)
t−k s
A
k + t − k, (5)
s
B
t ≤ (1 − δ)
t−k s
B
k + t − k. (6)








k + t − k
(1 − δ)
t−k sB
k + t − k
,
Since B wins forever after k, then for all t > k, Λt ≤ 1. Furthermore (Λt)t is















Then, there exists a real number 0 < ε1 < 1, such that a necessary condition










Claim 2: We claim that there exists k such that for all t ≥ k, A wins the
election t. Then for all t > k, Λt ≥ 1. By an argument symmetric to that of
Claim 1, (Λt)t converges to b Λ, and there exists a real number 0 < ε2 < 1,




















+ ln(1 + ε2)
ln(ηAηB)
,
then b Λ < 1 < e Λ, and Claim 1 and 2 are contradictory, so that no party can
win an inﬁnite number of consecutive elections. Then there exist α1 < α2
such that no party can win an inﬁnite number of consecutive elections.
Proof of Proposition 6:




























where µ = at
ηAsA
t−1 ∈ [0,1]. Here Λt > 1, and, by proposition 3, αm > 0.
The right-hand side of (7) is null when µ = 0 and equal to 1 when µ = αm.
Thus 7 admits a solution. If αm = 1, then the right-hand side is strictly
decreasing in µ, and the solution is unique. If αm < 1, then the right-hand
side is concave in µ, is null when µ = 0 or 1, and maximal when µ = αm.
Thus 7 has two diﬀerent solutions. Hence, the set of solutions is ﬁnite, then
























is the unique solution to this maximization problem, and the
optimal value of Λt+1 is a supremum of Λt+1 over MA (t).
Proof of Proposition 7: (i) It is simple to verify that the median voter’s
preferred program in A(t) when candidate A extracts a rent rA
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t to mB












21(ii) Symmetrically, the median voter preferred platform in B(t), when candi-
date B extracts a rent rB
















Then, the median voter weakly prefers e zB
t to mA
t if and only if:
r
B
t ≤ (1 − Λt)s
B
t−1.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Claim 1: There exists k such that for all t ≥ k, B wins the election t.
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t+1 = 1 + (1 − δ)s
B
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Since δ > 0, then sB
t converges to 1
δ, and sA
t to 1 + 1−δ
δ





Hence, Λt converges to:
e Λ(αm) =

δ + (1 − δ)







By Proposition 2, (Λt)t increases and we obtain that Claim 1 is equivalent
to e Λ(αm) ≤ 1. The inequality is weak, because by Corollary 2 Λt cannot
attain its limit when e Λ(αm) = 1. Let fB (αm) = e Λ(αm)−1, then Claim 1 is
equivalent to fB (αm) ≤ 0. Now we turn to the symmetric Claim for party
A:
Claim 2: There exists k such that for all t ≥ k, A wins the election t.
With the same arguments as those of Claim 1, we obtain that (Λt)t, which
is now decreasing, converges to:
b Λ(αm) =
1






And Claim 2 is equivalent to b Λ(αm) ≥ 1. Let fA (αm) = 1
b Λ(αm) − 1, then
Claim 2 is equivalent to fA (αm) ≤ 0. Furthermore,
f














0 when αm = 0 and δ (1 − η) < 0 when αm = 1. Hence, fA (αm) as a unique













2. Observe that fA (1 − αm) = fB (αm), then fB (αm) has a unique
root α1 < α2. Finally, Claim 1 and Claim 2 are both contradicted if and
only if αm ∈ [α1,α2].
Now we can turn to the comparative statics. α2 is implicitly deﬁned as a
function of δ and η by:
δη + (1 − δ)
 




2α2 = 0, (8)






N = 2α2 (η)
2α2−1 − δ − 2α2 (1 − δ)η,
and,







It is easy to verify that ∂N
∂δ = 2α2η − 1 > 0 because α2 > 1











∝ (1 − δ)(η)
2(1−α2) − (1 + 2α2 lnη),
Let g (α2) = (1 − δ)(η)
2(1−α2)−(1 + 2α2 lnη), then g0 (α2) < 0. Since g (1) =
−δ − 2α2 lnη, then ∂D










1 + (η2 − 1)α2 − η
D
,
23Here, the numerator of the right-hand side is increasing in α2 and is equal
to (η − 1)
2 when α2 = 1
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